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ABSTRACT
ML models are increasingly deployed in settings with real world interactions such as vehicles, but unfortunately,
these models can fail in systematic ways. To prevent errors, ML engineering teams monitor and continuously
improve these models. We propose a new abstraction, model assertions, that adapts the classical use of program
assertions as a way to monitor and improve ML models. Model assertions are arbitrary functions over a model’s
input and output that indicate when errors may be occurring, e.g., a function that triggers if an object rapidly changes
its class in a video. We propose methods of using model assertions at all stages of ML system deployment, including
runtime monitoring, validating labels, and continuously improving ML models. For runtime monitoring, we show
that model assertions can find high confidence errors, where a model returns the wrong output with high confidence,
which uncertainty-based monitoring techniques would not detect. For training, we propose two methods of using
model assertions. First, we propose a bandit-based active learning algorithm that can sample from data flagged
by assertions and show that it can reduce labeling costs by up to 40% over traditional uncertainty-based methods.
Second, we propose an API for generating “consistency assertions” (e.g., the class change example) and weak
labels for inputs where the consistency assertions fail, and show that these weak labels can improve relative model
quality by up to 46%. We evaluate model assertions on four real-world tasks with video, LIDAR, and ECG data.
1 INTRODUCTION
ML is increasingly deployed in complex contexts that re-
quire inference about the physical world, from autonomous
vehicles (AVs) to precision medicine. However, ML models
can misbehave in unexpected ways. For example, AVs have
accelerated toward highway lane dividers (Lee, 2018) and
can rapidly change their classification of objects over time,
causing erratic behavior (Coldewey, 2018; NTSB, 2019). As
a result, quality assurance (QA) of models, including contin-
uous monitoring and improvement, is of paramount concern.
Unfortunately, performing QA for complex, real-world
ML applications is challenging: ML models fail for diverse
and reasons unknown before deployment. Thus, existing
solutions that focus on verifying training, including formal
verification (Katz et al., 2017), whitebox testing (Pei et al.,
2017), monitoring training metrics (Renggli et al., 2019), and
validating training code (Odena & Goodfellow, 2018), only
give guarantees on a test set and perturbations thereof, so
models can still fail on the huge volumes of deployment data
that are not part of the test set (e.g., billions of images per day
in an AV fleet). Validating input schemas (Polyzotis et al.,
2019; Baylor et al., 2017) does not work for applications
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with unstructured inputs that lack meaningful schemas, e.g.,
images. Solutions that check whether model performance re-
mains consistent over time (Baylor et al., 2017) only apply to
deployments that have ground truth labels, e.g., click-through
rate prediction, but not to deployments that lack labels.
As a step towards more robust QA for complex ML appli-
cations, we have found that ML developers can often specify
systematic errors made by ML models: certain classes of
errors are repetitive and can be checked automatically, via
code. For example, in developing a video analytics engine,
we noticed that object detection models can identify boxes
of cars that flicker rapidly in and out of the video (Figure 1),
indicating some of the detections are likely wrong. Likewise,
our contacts at an AV company reported that LIDAR and cam-
era models sometimes disagree. While seemingly simple,
similar errors were involved with a fatal AV crash (NTSB,
2019). These systematic errors can arise for diverse reasons,
including domain shift between training and deployment
data (e.g., still images vs. video), incomplete training data
(e.g., no instances of snow-covered cars), and noisy inputs.
To leverage the systematic nature of these errors, we propose
model assertions, an abstraction to monitor and improve ML
model quality. Model assertions are inspired by program
assertions (Goldstine et al., 1947; Turing, 1949), one of the
most common ways to monitor software. A model assertion
is an arbitrary function over a model’s input and output that re-
turns a Boolean (0 or 1) or continuous (floating point) severity
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(a) Frame 1, SSD (b) Frame 2, SSD (c) Frame 3, SSD
(d) Frame 1, SSD (e) Frame 2, assertion
corrected
(f) Frame 3, SSD
Figure 1. Top row: example of flickering in three consecutive
frames of a video. The object detection method, SSD (Liu et al.,
2016), failed to identify the car in the second frame. Bottom row:
example of correcting the output of a model. The car bounding box
in the second frame can be inferred using nearby frames based on
a consistency assertion.
score to indicate when faults may be occurring. For example,
a model assertion that checks whether an object flickers in and
out of video could return a Boolean value over each frame or
the number of objects that flicker. While assertions may not
offer a complete specification of correctness, we have found
that assertions are easy to specify in many domains (§2).
We explore several ways to use model assertions, both at
runtime and training time.
First, we show that model assertions can be used for runtime
monitoring: they can be used to log unexpected behavior or
automatically trigger corrective actions, e.g., shutting down
an autopilot. Furthermore, model assertions can often find
high confidence errors, where the model has high certainty
in an erroneous output; these errors are problematic because
prior uncertainty-based monitoring would not flag these
errors. Additionally, and perhaps surprisingly, we have found
that many groups are also interested in validating human-
generated labels, which can be done using model assertions.
Second, we show that assertions can be used for active
learning, in which data is continuously collected to improve
ML models. Traditional active learning algorithms select
data to label based on uncertainty, with the intuition that
“harder” data where the model is uncertain will be more
informative (Settles, 2009; Coleman et al., 2020). Model
assertions provide another natural way to find “hard” exam-
ples. However, using assertions in active learning presents
a challenge: how should the active learning algorithm
select between data when several assertions are used? A
data point can be flagged by multiple assertions or a single
assertion can flag multiple data points, in contrast to a single
uncertainty metric. To address this challenge, we present a
novel bandit-based active learning algorithm (BAL). Given
a set of data that have been flagged by potentially multiple
model assertions, our bandit algorithm uses the assertions’
severity scores as context (i.e., features) and maximizes the
marginal reduction in the number of assertions fired (§3).
We show that our bandit algorithm can reduce labeling costs
by up to 40% over traditional uncertainty-based methods.
Third, we show that assertions can be used for weak
supervision (Mintz et al., 2009; Ratner et al., 2017). We
propose an API for writing consistency assertions about
how attributes of a model’s output should relate that
can also provide weak labels for training. Consistency
assertions specify that data should be consistent between
attributes and identifiers, e.g., a TV news host (identifier)
should have consistent gender (attribute), or that certain
predictions should (or should not) exist in temporally related
outputs, e.g., cars in adjacent video frames (Figure 1). We
demonstrate that this API can apply to a range of domains,
including medical classification and TV news analytics.
These weak labels can be used to improve relative model
quality by up to 46% with no additional human labeling.
We implement model assertions in a Python library, OMG1,
that can be used with existing ML frameworks. We evaluate
assertions on four ML applications: understanding TV news,
AVs, video analytics, and classifying medical readings. We
implement assertions for systematic errors reported by ML
users in these domains, including checking for consistency
between sensors, domain knowledge about object locations in
videos, and medical knowledge about heart patterns. Across
these domains, we find that model assertions we consider can
be written with at most 60 lines of code and with 88-100%
precision, that these assertions often find high-confidence
errors (e.g., top 90th percentile by confidence), and that our
new algorithms for active learning and weak supervision via
assertions improve model quality over existing methods.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
1. We introduce the abstraction of model assertions for
monitoring and continuously improving ML models.
2. We show that model assertions can find high confidence
errors, which would not be flagged by uncertainty metrics.
3. We propose a bandit algorithm to select data points for
active learning via model assertions and show that it can
reduce labeling costs by up to 40%.
4. We propose an API for consistency assertions that can
automatically generate weak labels for data where the
assertion fails, and show that weak supervision via these
labels can improve relative model quality by up to 46%.
2 MODEL ASSERTIONS
We describe the model assertion interface, examples of
model assertions, how model assertions can integrate into the
ML development/deployment cycle, and its implementation
in OMG.
1OMG is a recursive acronym for OMG Model Guardian.
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2.1 Model Assertions Interface
We formalize the model assertions interface. Model
assertions are arbitrary functions that can indicate when
an error is likely to have occurred. They take as input a list
of inputs and outputs from one or more ML models. They
return a severity score, a continuous value that indicates
the severity of an error of a specific type. By convention,
the 0 value represents an abstention. Boolean values can be
implemented in model assertions by only returning 0 and
1. The severity score does not need to be calibrated, as our
algorithms only use the relative ordering of scores.
As a concrete example, consider an AV with a LIDAR sensor
and camera and object detection models for each sensor. To
check that these models agree, a developer may write:
def sensor_agreement(lidar_boxes, camera_boxes):
failures = 0
for lidar_box in lidar_boxes:
if no_overlap(lidar_box, camera_boxes):
failures += 1
return failures
Notably, our library OMG can register arbitrary Python
functions as model assertions.
2.2 Example Use Cases and Assertions
In this section, we provide use cases for model assertions that
arose in discussions with industry and academic contacts,
including AV companies and academic labs. We show
example of errors caught by the model assertions described
in this section in Appendix A and describe how one might
look for assertions in other domains in Appendix B.
Our discussions revealed two key properties in real-world
ML systems. First, ML models are deployed on orders of
magnitude more data than can reasonably be labeled, so a
labeled sample cannot capture all deployment conditions.
For example, the fleet of Tesla vehicles will see over 100×
more images in a day than in the largest existing image
dataset (Sun et al., 2017). Second, complex ML deployments
are developed by large teams, of which some developers may
not have the ability to manage all parts of the application.
As a result, it is critical to be able to do QA collaboratively
to cover the application end-to-end.
Analyzing TV news. We spoke to a research lab studying
bias in media via automatic analysis. This lab collected over
10 years of TV news (billions of frames) and executed face
detection every three seconds. These detections are subse-
quently used to identify the faces, detect gender, and classify
hair color using ML models. Currently, the researchers have
no method of identifying errors and manually inspect data.
However, they additionally compute scene cuts. Given that
most TV new hosts do not move much between scenes, we
can assert that the identity, gender, and hair color of faces that
highly overlap within the same scene are consistent (Figure 6,
Appendix). We further describe how model assertions can be
implemented via our consistency API for TV news in §4.
Autonomous vehicles (AVs). AVs are required to execute a
variety of tasks, including detecting objects and tracking lane
markings. These tasks are accomplished with ML models
from different sensors, such as visual, LIDAR, or ultrasound
sensors (Davies, 2018). For example, a vision model might
be used to detect objects in video and a point cloud model
might be used to do 3D object detection.
Our contacts at an AV company noticed that models from
video and point clouds can disagree. We implemented a
model assertion that projects the 3D boxes onto the 2D cam-
era plane to check for consistency. If the assertion triggers,
then at least one of the sensors returned an incorrect answer.
Video analytics. Many modern, academic video analytics
systems use an object detection method (Kang et al., 2017;
2019; Hsieh et al., 2018; Jiang et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2019;
Canel et al., 2019) trained on MS-COCO (Lin et al., 2014),
a corpus of still images. These still image object detection
methods are deployed on video for detecting objects. None
of these systems aim to detect errors, even though errors can
affect analytics results.
In developing such systems, we noticed that objects flicker
in and out of the video (Figure 1) and that vehicles overlap
in unrealistic ways (Figure 7, Appendix). We implemented
assertions to detect these.
Medical classification. Deep learning researchers have
created deep networks that can outperform cardiologists for
classifying atrial fibrillation (AF, a form of heart condition)
from single-lead ECG data (Rajpurkar et al., 2019). Our re-
searcher contacts mentioned that AF predictions from DNNs
can rapidly oscillate. The European Society of Cardiology
guidelines for detecting AF require at least 30 seconds of
signal before calling a detection (EHRA, 2010). Thus, pre-
dictions should not rapidly switch between two states. A
developer could specify this model assertion, which could be
implemented to monitor ECG classification deployments.
2.3 Using Model Assertions for QA
We describe how model assertions can be integrated with ML
development and deployment pipelines. Importantly, model
assertions are complementary to a range of other ML QA
techniques, including verification, fuzzing, and statistical
techniques, as shown in Figure 2.
First, model assertions can be used for monitoring and
validating all parts of the ML development/deployment
pipeline. Namely, model assertions are agnostic to the
source of the output, whether they be ML models or human
labelers. Perhaps surprisingly, we have found several groups
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Figure 2. A system diagram of how model assertions can integrate
into the ML development/deployment pipeline. Users can
collaboratively add to an assertion database. We also show
how related work can be integrated into the pipeline. Notably,
verification only gives guarantees on a test set and perturbations
thereof, but not on arbitrary runtime data.
to also be interested in monitoring human label quality. Thus,
concretely, model assertions can be used to validate human
labels (data collection) or historical data (validation), and
to monitor deployments (e.g., to populate dashboards).
Second, model assertions can be used at training time to
select which data points to label in active learning. We
describe BAL, our algorithm for data selection, in §3.
Third, model assertions can be used to generate weak labels
to further train ML models without additional human labels.
We describe how OMG accomplishes this via consistency
assertions in §4. Users can also register their own weak
supervision rules.
2.4 Implementing Model Assertions in OMG
We implement a prototype library for model assertions,
OMG, that works with existing Python ML training and
deployment frameworks. We briefly describe OMG’s
implementation.
OMG logs user-defined assertions as callbacks. The simplest
way to add an assertion is through AddAssertion(func),
where func is a function of the inputs and outputs (see
below). OMG also provides an API to add consistency asser-
tions as described in §4. Given this database, OMG requires
a callback after model execution that takes the model’s input
and output as input. Given the model’s input and output,
OMG will execute the assertions and record any errors. We
assume the assertion signature is similar to the following;
this assertion signature is for the example in Figure 1:
def flickering(recent_frames: List[PixelBuf],
recent_outputs: List[BoundingBox]) -> Float
For active learning, OMG will take a batch of data and return
indices for which data points to label. For weak supervision,
OMG will take data and return weak labels where valid.
Users can specify weak labeling functions associated with
assertions to help with this.
In the following two sections, we describe two key methods
that OMG uses to improve model quality: BAL for active
learning and consistency assertions for weak supervision.
3 USING MODEL ASSERTIONS
FOR ACTIVE LEARNING WITH BAL
We introduce an algorithm called BAL to select data for
active learning via model assertions. BAL assumes that a set
of data points has been collected and a subset will be labeled
in bulk. We found that labeling services (sca, 2019) and our
industrial contacts usually label data in bulk.
Given a set of data points that triggered model assertions,
OMG must select which points to label. There are two key
challenges which make data selection intractable in its full
generality. First, we do not know the marginal utility of
selecting a data point to label without labeling the data point.
Second, even with labels, estimating the marginal gain of
data points is expensive to compute as training modern ML
models is expensive.
To address these issues, we make simplifying assumptions.
We describe the statistical model we assume, the resource-
unconstrained algorithm, our simplifying assumptions,
and BAL. We note that, while the resource-unconstrained
algorithm can produce statistical guarantees, BAL does not.
We instead empirically verify its performance in Section 5.
Data selection as multi-armed bandits. We cast the data
selection problem as a multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem
(Auer et al., 2002; Berry & Fristedt, 1985). In MABs, a set of
“arms” (i.e., individual data points) is provided and the user
must select a set of arms (i.e., points to label) to achieve the
maximal expected utility (e.g., maximize validation accuracy,
minimize number of assertions that fire). MABs have been
studied in a wide variety of settings (Radlinski et al., 2008; Lu
et al., 2010; Bubeck et al., 2009), but we assume that the arms
have context associated with them (i.e., severity scores from
model assertions) and give submodular rewards (defined
below). The rewards are possibly time-varying. We further
assume there is an (unknown) smoothness parameter that
determines the similarity between arms of similar contexts
(formally, the α in the Ho¨lder condition (Evans, 1998)). The
following presentation is inspired by Chen et al. (2018).
Concretely, we assume the data will be labeled in T rounds
and denote the rounds t=1,...,T . We refer to the set ofn data
points asN={1,...,n}. Each data point has a d dimensional
feature vector associated with it, where d is the number of
model assertions. We refer to the feature vector as xti, where
i is the data point index and t is the round index; from here,
we will refer to the data points as xti. Each entry in a feature
vector is the severity score from a model assertion. The
feature vectors can change over time as the model predictions,
and therefore assertions, change over the course of training.
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Input: T ,Bt,N ,R
Output: choice of arms St at rounds 1,...,T
for t=1,...,T do
if Underexplored arms then
Select
arms St from under-explored contexts at random
else
Select arms St by highest marginal gain (Eq. 1):
for i=1,...,Bt do
Sti =argmaxj∈N\Sti−1∆R({j},S
t
i−1)
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: A summary of the CC-MAB algorithm.
CC-MAB first explores under-explored arms, then greedily
selects arms with highest marginal gain. Full details are
given in (Chen et al., 2018).
We assume there is a budget on the number of arms (i.e., data
points to label),Bt, at every round. The user must select a set
of arms St={xs1 ,...,xsBt} such that |St|≤Bt. We assume
that the reward from the arms, R(St), is submodular in St.
Intuitively, submodularity implies diminishing marginal
returns: adding the 100th data point will not improve the
reward as much as adding the 10th data point. Formally, we
first define the marginal gain of adding an extra arm:
∆R({m},A)=R(A∪{m})−R(A). (1)
whereA⊂N is a subset of arms andm∈N is an additional
arm such that m 6∈A. The submodularity condition states
that, for anyA⊂C⊂N andm 6∈C
∆R({m},A)≥∆R({m},C). (2)
Resource-unconstrained algorithm. Assuming an infinite
labeling and computational budget, we describe an algorithm
that selects data points to train on. Unfortunately, this algo-
rithm is not feasible as it requires labels for every point and
training the ML model many times.
If we assume that rewards for individual arms can be queried,
then a recent bandit algorithm, CC-MAB (Chen et al., 2018)
can achieve a regret of O(cT
2αd
3αd log(T )) for α to be the
smoothness parameter. A regret bound is the (asymptotic)
difference with respect to an oracle algorithm. Briefly,
CC-MAB explores under-explored arms until it is confident
that certain arms have highest reward. Then, it greedily takes
the highest reward arms. Full details are given in (Chen et al.,
2018) and summarized in Algorithm 1.
Unfortunately, CC-MAB requires access to an estimate of
selecting a single arm. Estimating the gain of a single arm
requires a label and requires retraining and reevaluating the
model, which is computationally infeasible for expensive-
to-train ML models, especially modern deep networks.
Input: T ,Bt,N ,R
Output: choice of arms St at rounds 1,...,T
for t=1,...,T do
if t = 0 then
Select data points
uniformly at random from the dmodel assertions
else
Compute the marginal reduction
rm of the number of times model assertion
m=1,...,d triggered from the previous round;
if all rm<1% then
Fall back to baseline method;
continue;
end
for i=1,...,Bt do
Select model assertionm proportional to rm;
Select xi that triggersm,
sample proportional to severity score rank;
Add xi to St;
end
end
end
Algorithm 2: BAL algorithm for data selection for
continuous training. BAL samples from the assertions
at random in the first round, then selects the assertions
that result in highest marginal reduction in the number of
assertions that fire in subsequent rounds. BAL will default
to random sampling or uncertainty sampling if none of the
assertions reduce.
Resource-constrained algorithm. We make simplify-
ing assumptions and use these to modify CC-MAB for the
resource-constrained setting. Our simplifying assumptions
are that 1) data points with similar contexts (i.e., xti) are inter-
changeable, 2) data points with higher severity scores have
higher expected marginal gain, and 3) reducing the number
of triggered assertions will increase accuracy.
Under these assumptions, we do not require an estimate of the
marginal reward for each arm. Instead, we can approximate
the marginal gain from selecting arms with similar contexts
by the total number of these arms that were selected. This
has two benefits. First, we can train a model on a set of arms
(i.e., data points) in batches instead of adding single arms at
a time. Second, we can select data points of similar contexts
at random, without having to compute its marginal gain.
Leveraging these assumptions, we can simplify Algorithm 1
to require less computation for training models and to not
require labels for all data points. Our algorithm is described
in Algorithm 2. Briefly, we approximate the marginal gain
of selecting batches of arms and select arms proportional
to the marginal gain. We additionally allocate 25% of the
budget in each round to randomly sample arms that triggered
different model assertions, uniformly; this is inspired by
-greedy algorithms (Tokic & Palm, 2011). This ensures
that no contexts (i.e., model assertions) are underexplored as
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training progresses. Finally, in some cases (e.g., with noisy
assertions), it may not be possible to reduce the number of
assertions that fire. In this case, BAL will default to random
sampling or uncertainty sampling, as specified by the user.
4 CONSISTENCY ASSERTIONS AND
WEAK SUPERVISION
Although developers can write arbitrary Python functions
as model assertions in OMG, we found that many assertions
can be specified using an even simpler, high-level abstraction
that we called consistency assertions. This interface allows
OMG to generate multiple Boolean model assertions from
a high-level description of the model’s output, as well as
automatic correction rules that propose new labels for data
that fail the assertion to enable weak supervision.
The key idea of consistency assertions is to specify which
attributes of a model’s output are expected to match across
many invocations to the model. For example, consider a TV
news application that tries to locate faces in TV footage and
then identify their name and gender (one of the real-world
applications we discussed in §2.2). The ML developer
may wish to assert that, within each video, each person
should consistently be assigned the same gender, and should
appear on the screen at similar positions on most nearby
frames. Consistency assertions let developers specify such
requirements by providing two functions:
• An identification function that returns an identifier for
each model output. For example, in our TV application,
this could be the person’s name as identified by the model.
• An attributes function that returns a list of named
attributes expected to be consistent for each identifier. In
our example, this could return the gender attribute.
Given these two functions, OMG generates multiple Boolean
assertions that check whether the various attributes of outputs
with a common identifier match. In addition, it generates
correction rules that can replace an inconsistent attribute with
a guess at that attribute’s value based on other instances of the
identifier (we simply use the most common value). By run-
ning the model and these generated assertions over unlabeled
data, OMG can thus automatically generate weak labels
for data points that do not satisfy the consistency assertions.
Notably, OMG provides another way of producing labels for
training that is complementary to human-generated labels
and other sources of weak labels. OMG is especially suited
for unstructured sources, e.g., video. We show in §5 that
these weak labels can automatically increase model quality.
4.1 API Details
The consistency assertions API supports ML applications
that run over multiple inputs xi and produce zero or more
outputs yi,j for each input. For example, each output could
be an object detected in a video frame. The user provides
two functions over outputs yi,j :
• Id(yi,j) returns an identifier for the output yi,j , which is
simply an opaque value.
• Attrs(yi,j) returns zero or more attributes for the output
yi,j , which are key-value pairs.
In addition to checking attributes, we found that many appli-
cations also expect their identifiers to appear in a “temporally
consistent” fashion, where objects do not disappear and
reappear too quickly. For example, one would expect cars
identified in the video to stay on the screen for multiple frames
instead of “flickering” in and out in most cases. To express
this expectation, developers can provide a temporal consis-
tency threshold,T , which specifies that each identifier should
not appear or disappear for intervals less than T seconds. For
example, we might set T to one second for TV footage that
frequently cuts across frames, or 30 seconds for an activity
classification algorithm that distinguishes between walking
and biking. The full API for adding a consistency assertion
is therefore AddConsistencyAssertion(Id,Attrs, T ).
Examples. We briefly describe how one can use consistency
assertions in several ML tasks motivated in §2.2:
Face identification in TV footage: This application uses
multiple ML models to detect faces in images, match them
to identities, classify their gender, and classifier their hair
color. We can use the detected identity as our Id function
and gender/hair color as attributes.
Video analytics for traffic cameras: This application aims
to detect vehicles in video street traffic, and suffers from
problems such as flickering or changing classifications for an
object. The model’s output is bounding boxes with classes
on each frame. Because we lack a globally unique identifier
(e.g., license plate number) for each object, we can assign a
new identifier for each box that appears and assign the same
identifier as it persists through the video. We can treat the
class as an attribute and set T as well to detect flickering.
Heart rhythm classification from ECGs: In this application,
domain experts informed us that atrial fibrillation heart
rhythms need to persist for at least 30 seconds to be
considered a problem. We used the detected class as our
identifier and set T to 30 seconds.
4.2 Generating Assertions and Labels from the API
Given the Id, Attrs, and T values, OMG automatically
generates Boolean assertions to check for matching attributes
and to check that when an identifier appears in the data, it
persists for at least T seconds. These assertions are treated
the same as user-provided ones in the rest of the system.
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OMG also automatically generates corrective rules that
propose a new label for outputs that do not match their
identifier’s other outputs on an attribute. The default
behavior is to propose the most common value of that
attribute (e.g., the class detected for an object on most
frames), but users can also provide a WeakLabel function
to suggest an alternative based on all of that object’s outputs.
For temporal consistency constraints via T , OMG will as-
sert by default that at most one transition can occur within a
T -second window; this can be overridden. For example, an
identifier appearing is valid, but an identifier appearing, disap-
pearing, then appearing is invalid. If a violation occurs, OMG
will propose to remove, modify, or add predictions. In the
latter case, OMG needs to know how to generate an expected
output on an input where the object was not identified (e.g.,
frames where the object flickered out in Figure 1). OMG
requires the user to provide a WeakLabel function to cover
this case, since it may require domain specific logic, e.g.,
averaging the locations of the object on nearby video frames.
5 EVALUATION
5.1 Experimental Setup
We evaluated OMG and model assertions on four diverse ML
workloads based on real industrial and academic use-cases:
analyzing TV news, video analytics, autonomous vehicles,
and medical classification. For each domain, we describe
the task, dataset, model, training procedure, and assertions.
A summary is given in Table 1.
TV news. Our contacts analyzing TV news provided us 50
hour-long segments that were known to be problematic. They
further provided pre-computed boxes of faces, identities,
and hair colors; this data was computed from a range of
models and sources, including hand-labeling, weak labels,
and custom classifiers. We implemented the consistency
assertions described in §4. We were unable to access the
training code for this domain so were unable to perform
retraining experiments for this domain.
Video analytics. Many modern video analytics systems use
object detection as a core primitive (Kang et al., 2017; 2019;
Hsieh et al., 2018; Jiang et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2019; Canel
et al., 2019), in which the task is to localize and classify
the objects in a frame of video. We focus on the object
detection portion of these systems. We used a ResNet-34
SSD (Liu et al., 2016) (henceforth SSD) model pretrained on
MS-COCO (Lin et al., 2014). We deployed SSD for detecting
vehicles in the night-street (i.e., jackson) video that is
commonly used (Kang et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2019; Canel
et al., 2019; Hsieh et al., 2018). We used a separate day of
video for training and testing.
We deployed three model assertions: multibox, flicker,
and appear. The multibox assertion fires when three
boxes highly overlap (Figure 7, Appendix). The flicker
andappear assertions are implemented with our consistency
API as described in §4.
Autonomous vehicles. We studied the problem of ob-
ject detection for autonomous vehicles using the NuScenes
dataset (Caesar et al., 2019), which contains labeled LIDAR
point clouds and associated visual images. We split the data
into separate train, unlabeled, and test splits. We detected
vehicles only. We use the open-source Second model with
PointPillars (Yan et al., 2018; Lang et al., 2019) for LIDAR
detections and SSD for visual detections. We improve SSD
via active learning and weak supervision in our experiments.
As NuScenes contains time-aligned point clouds and images,
we deployed a custom assertion for 2D and 3D boxes
agreeing, and the multibox assertion. We deployed a
custom weak supervision rule that imputed boxes from the
3D predictions. While other assertions could have been
deployed (e.g., flicker), we found that the dataset was not
sampled frequently enough (at 2 Hz) for these assertions.
Medical classification. We studied the problem of clas-
sifying atrial fibrillation (AF) via ECG signals. We used a
convolutional network that was shown to outperform car-
diologists (Rajpurkar et al., 2019). Unfortunately, the full
dataset used in (Rajpurkar et al., 2019) is not publicly avail-
able, so we used the CINC17 dataset (cin, 2017). CINC17
contains 8,528 data points that we split into train, validation,
unlabeled, and test splits.
We consulted with medical researchers and deployed an
assertion that asserts that the classification should not change
between two classes in under a 30 second time period (i.e.,
the assertion fires when the classification changes from
A→B→Awithin 30 seconds), as described in §4.
5.2 Model Assertions can be Written with
High Precision and Few LOC
We first asked whether model assertions could be written
succinctly. To test this, we implemented the model assertions
described above and counted the lines of code (LOC)
necessary for each assertion. We count the LOC for the
identity and attribute functions for the consistency assertions
(see Table 1 for a summary of assertions). We counted the
LOC with and without the shared helper functions (e.g.,
computing box overlap); we double counted the helper
functions when used between assertions. As we show in
Table 2, both consistency and domain-specific assertions
can be written in under 25 LOC excluding shared helper
functions and under 60 LOC when including helper functions.
Thus, model assertions can be written with few LOC.
We then asked whether model assertions could be written
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Task Model Assertions
TV news Custom Consistency (§4, news)
Object detection (video) SSD (Liu et al., 2016) Three vehicles should not highly overlap (multibox), identity
consistency assertions (flicker and appear)
Vehicle detection (AVs) Second (Yan et al., 2018), SSD Agreement of Point cloud and image detections (agree), multibox
AF classification ResNet (Rajpurkar et al., 2019) Consistency assertion within a 30s time window (ECG)
Table 1. A summary of tasks, models, and assertions used in our evaluation.
Assertion LOC (no helpers) LOC (inc. helpers)
news 7 39
ECG 23 50
flicker 18 60
appear 18 35
multibox 14 28
agree 11 28
Table 2. Number of lines of code (LOC) for each assertion.
Consistency assertions are on the top and custom assertions
are on the bottom. All assertions could be written in under 60
LOC including helper functions, when double counting between
assertions. The assertion main body could be written in under 25
LOC in all cases. The helper functions included utilities such as
computing the overlap between boxes.
Precision Precision
Assertion (identifier and output) (model output only)
news 100% 100%
ECG 100% 100%
flicker 100% 96%
appear 100% 88%
multibox N/A 100%
agree N/A 98%
Table 3. Precision of our model assertions we deployed on 50
randomly selected examples. The top are consistency assertions
and the bottom are custom assertions. We report both precision in
the ML model outputs only and when counting errors in the identi-
fication function and ML model outputs for consistency assertions.
As shown, model assertions can be written with 88-100% precision
across all domains when only counting errors in the model outputs.
with high precision. To test this, we randomly sampled
50 data points that triggered each assertion and manually
checked whether that data point had an incorrect output from
the ML model. The consistency assertions return clusters
of data points (e.g., appear) and we report the precision
for errors in both the identifier and ML model outputs and
only the ML model outputs. As we show in Table 3, model
assertions achieve at least 88% precision in all cases.
5.3 Model Assertions can Identify
High-Confidence Errors
We asked whether model assertions can identify high-
confidence errors, or errors where the model returns the
wrong output with high confidence. High-confidence
errors are important to identify as confidence is used in
downstream tasks, such as analytics queries and actuation
decisions (Kang et al., 2017; 2019; Hsieh et al., 2018; Chin-
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Figure 3. Percentile of confidence of the top-10 ranked errors by
confidence found by OMG for video analytics. The x-axis is the
rank of the errors caught by model assertions, ordered by rank.
The y-axis is the percentile of confidence among all the boxes.
As shown, model assertions can find errors where the original
model has high confidence (94th percentile), allowing them to
complement existing confidence-based methods for data selection.
chali et al., 2019). Furthermore, sampling solutions that are
based on confidence would be unable to identify these errors.
To determine whether model assertions could identify high
confidence errors, we collected the 10 data points with
highest confidence error for each of the model assertions
deployed for video analytics. We then plotted the percentile
of the confidence among all the boxes for each error.
As shown in Figure 3, model assertions can identify errors
within the top 94th percentile of boxes by confidence
(the flicker confidences were from the average of the
surrounding boxes). Importantly, uncertainty-based methods
of monitoring would not catch these errors.
We further show that model assertions can identify errors
in human labels, which effectively have a confidence of 1.
These results are shown in Appendix E.
5.4 Model Assertions can Improve Model Quality
via Active Learning
We evaluated OMG’s active learning capabilities and BAL
using the three domains for which we had access to the
training code (visual analytics, ECG, AVs).
Multiple model assertions. We asked whether multiple
model assertions could be used to improve model quality
via continuous data collection. We deployed three asser-
tions over night-street and two assertions for NuScenes.
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(b) Active learning for NuScenes.
Figure 4. Performance of random sampling, uncertainty sampling,
uniform sampling from model assertions, and BAL for active learn-
ing. The round is the round of data collection (see §3). As shown
in (a), BAL improves accuracy on unseen data and can achieve an
accuracy target (62% mAP) with 40% fewer labels compared to
random and uncertainty sampling for night-street. BAL also
outperforms both baselines for the NuScenes dataset as shown in (b).
We show figures with all rounds of active learning in Appendix D.
We used random sampling, uncertainty sampling with “least
confident” (Settles, 2009), uniform sampling from data that
triggered assertions, and BAL for the active learning strate-
gies. We used the mAP metric for both datasets, which is
widely used for object detection (Lin et al., 2014; He et al.,
2017). We defer hyperparmeters to Appendix C.
As we show in Figure 4, BAL outperforms both random
sampling and uncertainty sampling on both datasets after the
first round, which is required for calibration. BAL also out-
performs uniform sampling from model assertions by the last
round. For night-street, at a fixed accuracy threshold
of 62%, BAL uses 40% fewer labels than random and uncer-
tainty sampling. By the fifth round, BAL outperforms both
random sampling and uncertainty sampling by 1.5% mAP.
While the absolute change in mAP may seem small, doubling
the model depth, which doubles the computational budget, on
MS-COCO achieves a 1.7% improvement in mAP (ResNet-
50 FPN vs. ResNet-101 FPN) (Girshick et al., 2018).
These results are expected, as prior work has shown that un-
certainty sampling can be unsuited for deep networks (Sener
& Savarese, 2017).
Single model assertion. Due to the limited data quantities
for the ECG dataset, we were unable to deploy more than one
assertion. Nonetheless, we further asked whether a single
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Figure 5. Active learning results with a single assertion for the ECG
dataset. As shown, with just a single assertion, model-assertion
based active learning can match uncertainty sampling and
outperform random sampling.
Domain Pretrained Weakly supervised
Video analytics (mAP) 34.4 49.9
AVs (mAP) 10.6 14.1
ECG (% accuracy) 70.7 72.1
Table 4. Accuracy of the pretrained and weakly supervised models
for video analytics, AV and ECG domains. Weak supervision can
improve accuracy with no human-generated labels.
model assertion could be used to improve model quality.
We ran five rounds of data labeling with 100 examples each
round for ECG datasets. We ran the experiment 8 times and
report averages. We show results in Figure 5. As shown, data
collection with a single model assertion generally matches
or outperforms both uncertainty and random sampling.
5.5 Model Assertions can Improve Model Quality
via Weak Supervision
We used our consistency assertions to evaluate the impact
of weak supervision using assertions for the domains we had
weak labels for (video analytics, AVs, and ECG).
For night-street, we used 1,000 additional frames with
750 frames that triggered flicker and 250 random frames
with a learning rate of 5×10−6 for a total of 6 epochs. For the
NuScenes dataset, we used the same 350 scenes to bootstrap
the LIDAR model as in the active learning experiments. We
trained with 175 scenes of weakly supervised data for one
epoch with a learning rate of 5×10−5. For the ECG dataset,
we used 1,000 weak labels and the same training procedure
as in active learning.
Table 4 shows that model assertion-based weak supervision
can improve relative performance by 46.4% for video analyt-
ics and 33% for AVs. Similarly, the ECG classification can
also improve with no human-generated labels. These results
show that model assertions can be useful as a primitive for
improving model quality with no additional data labeling.
6 RELATED WORK
ML QA. A range of existing ML QA tools focus on validat-
ing inputs via schemas or tracking performance over time
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(Polyzotis et al., 2019; Baylor et al., 2017). However, these
systems apply to situations with meaningful schemas (e.g.,
tabular data) and ground-truth labels at test time (e.g., pre-
dicting click-through rate). While model assertions could
also apply to these cases, they also cover situations that do
not contain meaningful schemas or labels at test time.
Other ML QA systems focus on training pipelines (Renggli
et al., 2019) or validating numerical errors (Odena &
Goodfellow, 2018). These approaches are important at
finding pre-deployment bugs, but do not apply to test-time
scenarios; they are complementary to model assertions.
White-box testing systems, e.g., DeepXplore (Pei et al.,
2017), test ML models by taking inputs and perturbing
them. However, as discussed, a validation set cannot cover
all possibilities in the deployment set. Furthermore, these
systems do not give guarantees under model drift.
Since our initial workshop paper (Kang et al., 2018), several
works have extended model assertions (Arechiga et al., 2019;
Henzinger et al., 2019).
Verified ML. Verification has been applied to ML models in
simple cases. For example, Reluplex (Katz et al., 2017) can
verify that extremely small networks will make correct con-
trol decisions given a fixed set of inputs and other work has
shown that similarly small networks can be verified against
minimal perturbations of a fixed set of input images (Raghu-
nathan et al., 2018). However, verification requires a specifi-
cation, which may not be feasible to implement, e.g., even
humans may disagree on certain predictions (Kirillov et al.,
2018). Furthermore, the largest verified networks we are
aware of (Katz et al., 2017; Raghunathan et al., 2018; Wang
et al., 2018; Sun et al., 2019) are orders of magnitude smaller
than the networks we consider.
Software Debugging. Writing correct software and verify-
ing software has a long history, with many proposals from the
research community. We hope that many such practices are
adopted in deploying machine learning models; we focus on
assertions in this work (Goldstine et al., 1947; Turing, 1949).
Assertions have been shown to reduce the prevalence of bugs,
when deployed correctly (Kudrjavets et al., 2006; Mahmood
et al., 1984). There are many other such methods, such as
formal verification (Klein et al., 2009; Leroy, 2009; Keller,
1976), conducting large-scale testing (e.g., fuzzing) (Takanen
et al., 2008; Godefroid et al., 2012), and symbolic execution
to trigger assertions (King, 1976; Cadar et al., 2008). Proba-
bilistic assertions have been used to verify simple distribu-
tional properties of programs, such as differentially private
programs should return an expected mean (Sampson et al.,
2014). However, ML developers may not be able to specify
distributions and data may shift in deployment.
Structured Prediction, Inductive Bias. Several ML meth-
ods encode structure/inductive biases into training proce-
dures or models (BakIr et al., 2007; Haussler, 1988; BakIr
et al., 2007). While promising, designing algorithms and
models with specific inductive biases can be challenging for
non-experts. Additionally, these methods generally do not
contain runtime checks for aberrant behavior.
Weak Supervision, Semi-supervised Learning. Weak su-
pervision leverages higher-level and/or noisier input from
human experts to improve model quality (Mintz et al., 2009;
Ratner et al., 2017; Jin et al., 2018). In semi-supervised learn-
ing, structural assumptions over the data are used to leverage
unlabeled data (Zhu, 2011). However, to our knowledge,
both of these methods do not contain runtime checks and are
not used in model-agnostic active learning methods.
7 DISCUSSION
While we believe model assertions are an important step
towards a practical solution for monitoring and continuously
improving ML models, we highlight three important
limitations of model assertions, which may be fruitful
directions for future work.
First, certain model assertions may be difficult to express
in our current API. While arbitrary code can be expressed
in OMG’s API, certain temporal assertions may be better
expressed in a complex event processing language (Wu et al.,
2006). We believe that domain-specific languages for model
assertions will be a fruitful area of future research.
Second, we have not thoroughly evaluated model assertions’
performance in real-time systems. Model assertions may
add overhead to systems where actuation has tight latency
constraints, e.g., AVs. Nonetheless, model assertions can be
used over historical data for these systems. We are actively
collaborating with an AV company to explore these issues.
Third, certain issues in ML systems, such as bias in training
sets, are out of scope for model assertions. We hope that
complementary systems, such as TFX (Baylor et al., 2017),
can help improve quality in these cases.
8 CONCLUSION
In this work, we introduced model assertions, a model-
agnostic technique that allows domain experts to indicate
errors in ML models. We showed that model assertions can
be used at runtime to detect high-confidence errors, which
prior methods would not detect. We proposed methods to use
model assertions for active learning and weak supervision to
improve model quality. We implemented model assertions in
a novel library, OMG, and demonstrated that they can apply
to a wide range of real-world ML tasks, improving monitor-
ing, active learning, and weak supervision for ML models.
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(a) Frame 1 (b) Frame 2
Figure 6. Two example frames from the same scene with an
inconsistent attribute (the identity) from the TV news use case.
(a) Example error 1.
(b) Example error 2.
Figure 7. Examples errors when three boxes highly overlap (see
multibox in Section 5). Best viewed in color.
A EXAMPLES OF ERRORS
CAUGHT BY MODEL ASSERTIONS
In this section, we illustrate several errors caught by the
model assertions used in our evaluation.
First, we show an example error in the TV news use case in
Figure 6. Recall that these assertions were generated with
our consistency API (§4). In this example, the identifier is
the box’s sceneid and the attribute is the identity.
Second, we show an example error for the visual analytics
use case in Figure 7 for the multibox assertion. Here, SSD
erroneously detects multiple cars when there should be one.
Third, we show two example errors for the AV use case in
Figure 8 from the multibox and agree assertions.
(a) Example error flagged by multibox. SSD predicts three
trucks when only one should be detected.
(b) Example error flagged by agree. SSD misses the car on the
right and the LIDAR model predicts the truck on the left to be too
large.
Figure 8. Examples of errors that the multibox and agree
assertions catch for the NuScenes dataset. LIDAR model boxes
are in pink and SSD boxes are in green. Best viewed in color.
B CLASSES OF MODEL ASSERTIONS
We present a non-exhaustive list of common classes of model
assertions in Table 5 and below. Namely, we describe how
one might look for assertions in other domains.
Our taxonomization is not exact and several examples will
contain features from several classes of model assertions.
Prior work on schema validation (Polyzotis et al., 2019;
Baylor et al., 2017) and data augmentation (Wang & Perez,
2017; Taylor & Nitschke, 2017) can be cast in the model
assertion framework. As these have been studied, we do not
focus on these classes of assertions in this work.
Consistency assertions. An important class of model as-
sertions checks the consistency across multiple models or
sources of data. The multiple sources of data could be the
output of multiple ML models on the same data, multiple
sensors, or multiple views of the same data. The output
from the various sources should agree and consistency model
assertions specify this constraint. These assertions can be
generated via our API as described in §4.
Domain knowledge assertions. In many physical domains,
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Assertion class
Assertion
sub-class Description Examples
Consistency Multi-source Model outputs from multiple
sources should agree
• Verifying human labels (e.g., number of
labelers that disagree)
• Multiple models (e.g., number of models that
disagree)
Multi-modal Model outputs from multiple
modes of data should agree
• Multiple sensors (e.g., number of disagree-
ments from LIDAR and camera models)
• Multiple data sources (e.g., text and images)
Multi-view Model outputs from multiple views
of the same data should agree
• Video analytics (e.g., results from overlapping
views of different cameras should agree)
• Medical imaging (e.g., different angles should
agree)
Domain
knowledge
Physical Physical constraints
on model outputs
• Video analytics (e.g., cars should not flicker)
• Earthquake detection (e.g., earthquakes should
appear across sensors in physically consistent
ways)
• Protein-protein interaction (e.g., number of
overlapping atoms)
Unlikely
scenario
Scenarios that are
unlikely to occur
• Video analytics (e.g., maximum confidence
of 3 vehicles that highly overlap),
• Text generation (e.g., two of the same word
should not appear sequentially)
Perturbation Insertion Inserting certain types of data
should not modify model outputs
• Visual analytics (e.g., synthetically adding a
car to a frame of video should be detected as
a car),
• LIDAR detection (e.g., similar to visual
analytics)
Similar Replacing parts of the input with
similar data should not modify
model outputs
• Sentiment analysis (e.g., classification should
not change with synonyms)
• Object detection (e.g., painting objects differ-
ent colors should not change the detection)
Noise Adding noise should not
modify model outputs
• Image classification (e.g., small Gaussian
noise should not affect classification)
• Time series (e.g., small Gaussian noise should
not affect time series classification)
Input
validation
Schema
validation
Inputs should
conform to a schema
• Boolean features should not have inputs that
are not 0 or 1
• All features should be present
Table 5. Example of model assertions. We describe several assertion classes, sub-classes, and concrete instantiations of each class. In
parentheses, we describe a potential severity score or an application.
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domain experts can express physical constraints or unlikely
scenarios. As an example of a physical constraint, when
predicting how proteins will interact, atoms should not phys-
ically overlap. As an example of an unlikely scenario, boxes
of the visible part of cars should not highly overlap (Figure 7).
In particular, model assertions of unlikely scenarios may not
be 100% precise, i.e., will be soft assertions.
Perturbation assertions. Many domains contain input and
output pairs that can be perturbed (perhaps jointly) such that
the output does not change. These perturbations have been
widely studied through the lens of data augmentation (Wang
& Perez, 2017; Taylor & Nitschke, 2017) and adversarial
examples (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Athalye et al., 2018).
Input validation assertions. Domains that contain
schemas for the input data can have model assertions that
validate the input data based on the schema (Polyzotis et al.,
2019; Baylor et al., 2017). For example, boolean inputs
that are encoded with integral values (i.e., 0 or 1) should
never be negative. This class of assertions is an instance of
preconditions for ML models.
C HYPERPARAMETERS
Hyperparameters for active learning experiments. For
night-street, we used 300,000 frames of one day of video
for the training and unlabeled data. We sampled 100 frames
per round for five rounds and used 25,000 frames of a differ-
ent day of video for the test set. Due to the cost of obtaining
labels, we ran each trial twice.
For the NuScenes dataset, we used 350 scenes to bootstrap
the LIDAR model, 175 scenes for unlabeled/training data
for SSD, and 75 scenes for validation (out of the original 850
labeled scenes). We trained for one epoch at a learning rate
of 5×10−5. We ran 8 trials.
For the ECG dataset, we train for 5 rounds of active learning
with 100 samples per round. We use a learning rate of 0.001
until the loss plateaus, which the original training code did.
D FULL ACTIVE LEARNING FIGURES
We show active learning results for all rounds in Figure 9.
E MODEL ASSERTIONS CAN
IDENTIFY ERRORS IN HUMAN LABELS
We further asked whether model assertions could be used
to identify errors in human-generated labels, i.e., a human is
acting as a “ML model.” While verification of human labels
has been studied in the context of crowd-sourcing (Hirth
et al., 2013; Tran-Thanh et al., 2013), several production
labeling services (e.g., Scale (sca, 2019)) do not provide
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(a) Active learning for night-street.
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(b) Active learning for NuScenes.
Figure 9. Performance of random sampling, uncertainty sampling,
uniform sampling from model assertions, and BAL for active
learning. The round is the round of data collection (see §3). As
shown, BAL improves accuracy on unseen data and can achieve the
same accuracy (62% mAP) as random sampling with 40% fewer
labels for night-street. BAL also outperforms both baselines
for the NuScenes dataset.
Description Number
All labels 469
Errors 32
Errors caught 4
Table 6. Number of labels, errors, and errors caught from model
assertions for Scale-annotated images for the video analytics task.
As shown, model assertions caught 12.5% of the errors in this data.
annotator identification which is necessary to perform this
verification. We deployed a model assertion in which we
tracked objects across frames of a video using an automated
method and verified that the same object in different frames
had the same label.
We obtained labels for 1,000 random frames from
night-street from Scale AI (sca, 2019), which is used by
several autonomous vehicle companies. Table 6 summarizes
our results. Scale returned 469 boxes, which we manually
verified for correctness. There were no localization errors,
but there were 32 classification errors, of which the model
assertion caught 12.5%. Thus, we see that model assertions
can also be used to verify human labels.
